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ABSTRACT: The existing literature on the burden of proof has sought the rule's raison d'etre solely
within the court's problem of decision making under uncertainty. While this search has yielded many
insights, it has been less successful in providing a compelling explanation for why uncertainty in the
court's final assessment should act to the detriment of one party rather than the other. By viewing the
problem as one of mechanism design, this paper provides one explanation for the asymmetry. A rule
resembling the burden of proof emerges from the optimal design of a system of fact-finding tribunals in
the presence of: i) limited resources for the resolution of private disputes, and ii) asymmetric
information~as between the parties and the court- about the strength of cases prior to the court's having
expended the resources necessary for a hearing. The paper shows that if the objective in designing a trial
court system is accuracy of recovery granted, the "value" of having heard a case will depend in part on
the certainty with which the court makes its final award. An optimally designed court system will then
effectively filter-out "less valuable" cases by precommitting to a recovery policy in which plaintiffs
recover nothing unless they prove their cases with a threshold degree of certainty.
1. INTRODUCTION
Few principles of law are as well settled as that which says that the plaintiff, more
generally the moving party, shall have the burden of proving her claim with a
"preponderance of the evidence.1" Yet few principles have inspired as many differing
explanations and interpretations by legal and legal-economic commentators alike.
To date, most of the economic analysis of the burden of proof has attempted to
make sense of the rule in the context of the theory of decision making under
uncertainty—in particular, within a Bayesian framework in which the court begins with
prior beliefs about the veracity of relevant factual assertions and then updates these
beliefs according to Bayes' rule upon hearing the evidence placed before it. But the
burden of proof is difficult to find within this framework. If we assert that it instructs
the court to rule against the burdened party when the court is in "equipoise"--when its
updated beliefs put exactly probability 0.5 on the truth of the assertion—then we have
relegated the rule to a rare coincidence. If, on the other hand, we assert that the rule
requires the court to accept the factual assertion only when its updated beliefs exceed
some threshold above 0.5, then we save the rule from irrelevance, but beg even more
ardently the question of why we should so favor one party over the other-why, for
instance, we should feel less comfortable overcompensating plaintiffs than leaving legal
wrongs "unrighted."
The premise of this paper is that the theory of decision making under uncertainty,
by itself, does not and can not provide a satisfactory explanation of what the burden of
proof is or is supposed to be; that the burden of proof must instead be understood in the
context of mechanism design and asymmetric information. Under the present system of
civil litigation, potential plaintiffs are vested with the power to set in motion a costly
process of litigation, all of whose costs are not in the first instance their own. If this
were the entire system, society would continually find itself spending more to resolve
disputes than is warranted by the disputes themselves. One could internalize the full
social cost to plaintiff by simply charging her for all expended resources. But this
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would conflict with the immediate object of the system: to award "proper" recovery to
plaintiff, which however defined, must be net of her costs. On the other hand, if the
court system knew beforehand which cases would be worth the resources necessary to
resolve them, it could simply refuse to take those that were not. The problem is that
the court does not find out the worth of a case until after society has paid to hear it.
The solution, I will argue, is to announce to all potential plaintiffs that only those cases
that turn out to have been worth hearing will receive any recovery. Then potential
plaintiffs, who have superior information about the stakes and solidity of their claims,
will self-select, and on average only those cases worth hearing will make their way to
court.
The link between this rule and a burden rule based on uncertainty in the court's
final assessment comes through the determination of which cases are worth hearing.
For a trial court, concerned primarily with the accurate application of existing law, the
value of having adjudicated a case will turn in part, I will argue, on the court's
confidence that its ruling was the right one. The court's announced recovery policy
will then be to award nothing to plaintiff unless she proves her case with a threshold
"degree of certainty" (defined within). Thus, as with the actual burden of proof,
recovery under this rule will depend not only on the court's best estimate of the amount
that the plaintiff should be awarded, but also on the certainty with which the court
makes that estimation. Moreover, the optimal recovery policy will have the same
threshold structure evident in the actual rule: roughly, if we fix the expected value of
proper recovery (a random variable whose distribution is induced by the court's
posterior beliefs) and progressively decrease its variance, the optimal recovery policy
jumps from zero up to that expected value as the variance crosses the specified
threshold; thereafter, recovery remains fixed at that expected value regardless of the
degree to which the threshold exceeds variance. On the other hand, unlike the manner
in which the actual burden of proof seems to be applied in practice, the optimal
threshold for any given class of cases increases with the cost of litigation and/or
settlement and decreases with the expected value of proper recovery.
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In Section 2,1 catalogue and analyze existing attempts to make sense of the burden
of proof solely in the context of decision making under uncertainty. Readers familiar
with this literature will want to skip first to Section 3 which contains the basic model.
In Section 4, I add the possibility that parties may bargain before trial. Concluding
remarks appear in Section 5.
2. ATTEMPTS TO FIND THE BURDEN OF P R O O F IN T H E THEORY OF DECISION
MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
2.1 Ties Go to the Defendant
The most common interpretation of the burden of proof portrays it as a tie-breaker
rule. This is, for example, the interpretation adopted in James, Hazard and Leubsdorf
(1992) and Lempert and Saltzburg (1983). In contrast to its near ubiquitous acceptance,
however, the tie-breaker interpretation has the curious and unsettling property that as
soon as one tries to formalize it, it disappears. As noted, the odds that the court's
updated probability will land exactly on the knife edge of 0.5 are effectively nil. And
since this point concerns how priors are updated on the basis of evidence, it will hold
even if there are legal reasons to set the unconditional prior probability at 0.5.
2.2 The Raised Threshold
One way to save the burden of proof from the irrelevance of coincidence—and
perhaps what those who propose the tie-breaker rule really have in mind~is to interpret
the rule to mean that the court must be convinced that an assertion is true with some
probability greater than a threshold P, where P > 0.5. But while increasing P above
0.5, may give some operational bite to the preponderance standard, it leaves
unanswered the question of why we should favor the defendant in civil cases. As
Posner (1973) remarks, there seems to be no a priori reason for favoring erroneous
exoneration over erroneous liability.
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2.3 Biased Prior
Cooter and Ulen (1988) suggest that the burden of proof means that the court
should bias its prior in favor of the defendant. The analysis of this interpretation
depends on what it means to bias a prior. One possibility is that any shift in probability
weight that causes the unconditional (i.e. prior) probability of the truth of the factual
assertion to decrease is a proper bias. But biasing the prior in this manner seems
somewhat arbitrary, for it implies nothing about even the direction of change in the
posterior for any given presentation of evidence. It is, for example, possible to
decrease the unconditional probability of the factual assertion while mcreasing the
posterior after all but one possible presentations of evidence.
An alternative view is that the prior should be biased in such a way that affects all
conditional probabilities "uniformly." But in this case, the biased prior rule is
effectively equivalent to the raised threshold rule discussed above. More precisely, for
any threshold level P, we can find a "biased prior" such that for all evidence, the
decision made under the new prior with the threshold level set at P - \ is the same as
the decision made under the unbiased prior with threshold level P.
2.4 Confidence Levels (Cohen (1985))
Cohen views the burden of proof in terms of confidence intervals, mainstays in the
tool kit of classical statistics. But though Cohen takes pains to explain the confidence
interval in the context of classical
statistics, it is less clear from the article
how one would apply the notion to the
generic problem of legal fact-finding.2
One attempt to do so is illustrated in the





set of conceivable pairs of fact patterns x
and bodies of evidence y with a closed
(two dimensional) interval in the
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Cartesian plane. In this graph the factual assertion A- a subset of the state space-- is
true only at those states (x,y) for which x lies above a particular value3 x .
The fact finder begins with prior beliefs over the state space that induce a
conditional probability measure on fact patterns x for every value of evidence presented
y. Just as fixing y induces a distribution on x, fixing x induces a distribution on y, and
so any function thereof. A 95 % (for example) confidence interval is thus any pair of
functions of y, U(y) and L(y) with the property that for allx, the probability that both
U(y) > x and L(y) < x is 95%.
One particular type of confidence interval, and the one used by Cohen, fixes U(y)
at the maximal value for x, for all y. Placed in this context, Cohen's burden of proof
stipulates that we accept the fact A as legally true if and only if the observed value / of
the lower bound L(y) exceeds x .4
The first problem with applying any sort of confidence intervals to the legal fact-
finder's problem is that none may exist. Whether we can find functions U(y) and L(y)
with the property that the probability of L(y) < x < U(x) is 95 % (or any fixed
percentage) across all x, is by no means clear. In contrast, the problems in statistics to
which confidence intervals are applied have very special structures which guarantee the
existence of such intervals.
But even if we impose additional structure on the problem sufficient to guarantee
the existence of the confidence interval, a larger, more significant problem of
interpretation remains. Classical statisticians will say that after learning a particular y
and calculating the corresponding values u = U(y) and / = L(y), we know that the true
fact pattern* lies in the interval (l,u) "with 95% confidence." Whatever "confidence"
means here, it does not mean "probability" — it is not correct to say that there is a 95%
chance that the true fact pattern lies in the interval (I, u). In order to talk about the
probability that x lies in any particular range, we have to view x probabilistically, an
outlook which classical statistics does not admit. And even if we shift to the Bayesian
viewpoint and posit prior beliefs on (x,y) updated after revelation ofy, it is still not
generally true that, according to our posterior belief on x, x will lie in the interval (l,u)
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with probability .95. Our posterior on x, and thus our posterior belief that x lies in
(l,u) depend on both the structure of the fact finder's prior and the particular y which
has been observed. All we can say is that ex ante revelation oiy, there was a 95%
chance that the true value of x would lie between whatever values of U(y) and L(y) were
revealed. Ex post revelation of the evidence, y, the confidence interval has no
particular interpretation.5
Let us go yet another step and suppose hypothetically that the fact-finder's problem
had a structure sufficiently specialized6 to guarantee both that 95 % confidence intervals
exist and that they could be interpreted as one is tempted to interpret them: with the
word "probability" substituted for the word "confidence." Indeed, let us make the even
stronger assumption that it is possible to construct such "interpretable" confidence
intervals with the restriction that U(y) to be set constant at the maximal value taken by
x. We would then know, on observing y and subsequently calculating / = L(y), that x
was greater than / with probability .95. Cohen's burden of proof stipulates that we find
A to be true, if and only if / falls above the threshold x . With our hypothetically
interpretable confidence interval, this reduces to nothing more than the rule that we find
A true only in the case that its posterior probability is at least .95, which is precisely the
same as raising (or lowering) the threshold probability to the confidence coefficient.
2.5 Summary
Reflecting back on the four existing interpretations of the burden of proof, we see
that each attempts to find the burden of proof solely within the theory of decision
making under uncertainty, each at its best reduces to the second, "raised threshold"
interpretation, and none provides an explanation for why the threshold should be so
raised to favor one party over the other.
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3. T H E BASIC M O D E L
In the model presented in this section, the burden of proof is derived from the
court's optimization problem. The interpretation of the burden presented here, then,
comes part and parcel with its justification. Further, the structure which emerges does
not resemble a raised threshold, but instead is keyed to dispersion in the court's beliefs
after hearing the evidence, a statistic which rarely appears in straight Bayesian analysis,
but seems more in line with casual empiricism about the burden's true operation.
Our task is to design a trial court system, that is to say a system of fact-finding
tribunals. We have already set "the law" according to principles such as fairness and
efficiency. This law tells us how much a plaintiff should recover from a defendant7 as a
function of all the relevant factual information surrounding the case. The problem we
face in designing our trial court system is that we will not know, in any particular
dispute, what these facts are.8 As a result, we want to design a system whereby we can
learn more about the fact pattern before deciding how much, if anything, the plaintiff
should recover.
In designing this system we must be cognizant of its opportunity cost. Resources
used for the trial court system are resources that are not used for schools, national
defense, or even the legislative process whereby better law might be designed. We
therefore face a fundamental tradeoff in designing our trial court system—between, on
the one hand, effectively rewarding no recovery to the plaintiff9 and using the unspent
resources elsewhere, and, on the other hand, spending the resources necessary to hear
the case in the hope that the more informed decision we make by virtue of the hearing
will be sufficiently "better," in some sense, than awarding nothing.
Though it is difficult to make precise statements about the benefit to society of
awarding any particular level of recovery, it is easy to construct examples where not
hearing the case at all seems in retrospect like the best alternative. Suppose, for
example, that a $100,000 hearing determines that with probability 1, the defendant
owes the plaintiff $1 in damages. In retrospect, we would have been better off not
Sanchirico 8 The Burden of Proof
hearing the case in the first place: we would have saved $100,000 at the cost of leaving
the plaintiff $1 poorer and the defendant $1 richer than the law would like either to be.
3.1 An Objective Function for the Court System and the Induced Value of Hearing
Cases
To make more interesting statements about this tradeoff, we must commit to some
measure of the benefits of awarding a given level of recovery. I start with the much
simpler case in which the court knows the true fact pattern and will then extend the
analysis to the situation where it is unsure.
Suppose we knew for certain that the fact pattern in a given dispute was a> eQ,
where Q , the sample space of our uncertainty, is the set of all possible fact patterns. It
seems natural in this case that we would want our trial court to award the proper
recovery specified by law for that particular fact pattern. Call this amount L(co) and
view L as a random variable on Q . Saying that we prefer to award proper recovery is
the same as saying that awarding any amount greater than or less than L(a>) is worse
than awarding L{co) itself. In an important sense, then, we treat the two types of legal
error symmetrically.
One functional form which captures this symmetry, and turns out to be relatively
easy to work with, is the negative absolute difference between proper and actual
recovery, -\L(a>) - r\, where r stands for actual recovery awarded, our choice variable.
This functional form obviously attains a maximum at r = L(co) and is monotonically
increasing to the left of this value and monotonically decreasing to the right. In the
remainder of this paper, I will take this function to be the court's payoff function over
certain outcomes.10 In the case that the court is certain of the true fact pattern co eQ,
this function is its objective function in the (quite simple) mathematical programming
problem in which it chooses optimal recovery. As usual, the value of the problem itself
is the value of the objective function at its maximum, namely 0.
More realistically, even after the court hears the case, it is still unsure of the true
fact pattern. As in Bayesian decision theory, let us say that the court began the hearing
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with prior beliefs Po about the true fact pattern11 and then updated these beliefs on
hearing the evidence. Now it wishes to maximize expected payoffs based on these
updated beliefs. If its updated beliefs over the true co e Q are denoted by P, then it
will choose rto maximize -Ep\L{co)-r .
Letting FP denote the cumulative distribution of L under P, let us assume:
ASSUMPTION 1. FP, is continuous.
.12Then the distribution of L has a median and this is the optimal amount of recovery:
LEMMA 1. r* solves max- EP\L(co) - r\, if and only if FP(r*) = j .
Proof: A standard result.
Therefore, the value of the problem, max- Ep\L(a>) - r\, is -EP L(co) - vp . On
the other hand, if the court had not taken the case, recovery would have been in effect
zero and the corresponding value would be -Ep\L{a>)\. The difference between these
two expressions, namely, Ep\L{co)\ - Ep\L(o)) - vp is one measure of the ex post benefit
of having heard the case.
With a little manipulation we can express this expected benefit in a more
informative manner. Let Ji represent the upper mean of the random variable L, that
is, the expected value of L conditional on its exceeding its median, VP. In the usual
notation, this is EP\LL > v 1. Define the lower mean ju in a similar manner,
EP\LL < vp]. The difference Ji- ju between the lower and upper mean is a measure
of the "dispersion" of the random variable L. If the random variable is degenerate and
takes only one value, then this difference is zero. If the random variable takes only two
values with equal probability, this difference reduces to the difference between these
two values. This difference is as well a measure of dispersion for more complex
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distributions. One can show, for example, that if the random variable is distributed
either normally, uniformly or exponentially, then this difference is proportional to the
standard deviation. For convenience, then, I will dub this statistic, Ji- ju, the
dispersion of the random variable L and denote it as 5.
L E M M A 2. EP\L{co)\ - Ep\L{co) - vp\ = Ep\L(co)\ -
Proof:
Ep\L(a>)-
- L{a>))dFp + - vP)dFp
= P vpdFp - J" vpdFp - \VpL{co)dFp + J" L(co)dFp
J-<X y Jvp y J-00 JVp
Thus, the value of having heard the case increases in the ex post expected absolute
value L and decreases in the dispersion of the court's updated beliefs. Holding
expected absolute value constant, then, the court prefers cases which leave it with
"concentrated" beliefs to those which leave it with "diffuse" beliefs.
In determining whether the case was worth hearing, we would want to compare
this measure Ep\L(co)\ - %S of expected benefit with the opportunity cost of the
hearing. Of course, this measure of benefit need not be immediately comparable with
our most natural measure of opportunity costs. But for simplicity let us suppose that
opportunity cost, c of the hearing are stated in units that do make it comparable.13
Then, after having heard the case, we can make the following ex post judgment about
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whether doing so was a good idea: the case was worth hearing if and only if
EP\L(o))\ -jS turns out to exceed c .
3.2 Optimal Choice of Recovery Policy
If the court somehow knew what its updated beliefs P would be following the
hearing, it could determine ahead of time which cases to hear and which to dismiss
according to this comparison of costs and benefits. The problem, however, is that the
court does not learn whether a case is worth "paying" to hear until after it has paid to
hear it. The parties, however, do have much information about the value of their case
even before the case is played out in court. The court's problem is, thus, characterized
by an asymmetry of information.
Nevertheless, the court can get around this disadvantage, at least to some degree.
The court does learn the value of the case before awarding recovery. It can therefore
announce to all potential plaintiffs that if they bring a case to court which, in the end,
was not worth hearing, according to the criterion we have laid out, then the plaintiff
will receive little or no recovery. If the court sets this level below what it costs
plaintiffs to bring their cases, and plaintiffs have a good idea of what the court will
think after hearing all the evidence, then this policy will "filter out" plaintiffs whose
cases are not worth hearing. From the court's perspective, the result will resemble the
hypothetical just discussed, wherein the court knows before hand the value of each case
and accepts only those which meet its criterion. The important point for our purposes
is that the court's announcement to plaintiffs will bear a stark resemblance to the
current burden of proof in civil cases.
Formally, suppose that the court faces a population of potential cases, each
identified by the posterior belief, P regarding legal recovery L that it will inspire in
the court after the hearing. Let the probability measure Q on the set of all P represent
the population composition of cases.
For simplicity suppose that before bringing their cases, plaintiffs know exactly
what the court's posterior beliefs, P will be. The court chooses, not just recovery in
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each individual case, but a recovery policy r(P), for implementation by the trial court,
mapping posterior beliefs onto a prescribed amount of recovery for the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs also know this recovery policy and believe that it will be carried out by the
court system. (The credibility of the policy is an important issue and is discussed
below.) We also suppose also that costs plaintiffs n > 0 to bring suit. (In its natural
state, this cost lies with plaintiff; it can always be shifted via the recovery policy,
r(P).) Then a plaintiff who knows her case will inspire beliefs of P will file suit, if
and only if r(P) > n .
The court, like a Stackelberg leader, knows this "reaction function" and takes it
into account in setting its policy. The court's problem is therefore:
Choose r(P)
to Maximize J (-Ep\L(co) - r(P)\ - c)dQ + J -EP\L(CQ)\4Q (1)
r(P)>x r(P)<7t
Assuming that plaintiffs trial costs are less than the opportunity cost of the hearing
to society (which presumably contain plaintiffs costs),
ASSUMPTION 2. 0 < n < c,
we obtain
PROPOSITION 1. The recovery policy
[0, otherwise
if8<2Ep\L(o)\-2c
solves the court's problem (1).
Under this recovery policy, the court announces that it will decide all cases in two
steps. First it will test whether, after hearing all the evidence, the dispersion in its
beliefs fall below a threshold level. This threshold level of dispersion will not be
uniform across all cases but will depend on the expected level of proper recovery. If
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this threshold is exceeded, no recovery (or at least some amount less than n) will be
awarded. If, on the other hand, dispersion falls below this threshold, the plaintiff will
receive recovery equal to the court's best estimate of what the law prescribes, namely
the median of L .
This recovery policy bears a strong resemblance to, and thus helps make sense of,
the burden of proof in civil litigation. Under this optimal rule, it is not enough for the
plaintiff to prove that expected proper recovery is positive. The plaintiff must also do
so in such manner as to inspire in the court a level of confidence in its estimation, as
measured by the dispersion in the court's posterior belief. Should the court have
sufficient confidence, the plaintiff is awarded the median, regardless of whether the
plaintiff exceeds that level of confidence by a wide margin or no.
Moreover, this recovery policy enables the court system to do as well as it would if
it knew beforehand which cases were worth hearing and which were not. The
incentives which the rule creates guarantee that only those cases that the court would
have wanted to hear retrospectively are actually heard.
Proof of Proposition 1: Define the function
\-Ep\L((o) - r\ - c, r > K
' \-Ep\L{co\ T<K
The objective in problem (1) can be rewritten as:
\o(r(P),P)dQ.
Hence, it suffices to show that for all P, r(P) maximizes O(r,P). To this end, first
consider any P such that 8 > 2Ep\L{co)\ - 2 c o Ep\L{co)\ - %8 < c, so that r{P) = 0 .
By Lemma 2, then, -EP\L(co)\ > -Ep\L(co) - vp - c and so by Lemma 1, for all r,
-Ep\L{o))\ > -Ep\L{co) - r\ - c . Therefore, O(r,P) achieves a maximum of -E \L(CD)\
at any r with r < K ; in particular, at r(P) = 0 .
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Now suppose that 8 < 2Ep\L(a>)\ - 2c <=> Ep\L(eo)\ -\8>c and vp > n. Then by
Lemma 2, -Ep\L{co)\ < -Ep L{co) -vp-c and since vp > n, O ( r , P ) must attain its
maximum where r>n. By Lemma 1, this is at vp = r(P).
Lastly suppose that 8 < 2Ep\L(co)\ - 2c <=> Ep\L(a>)\ -\8>c and vp < n. Then the
largest value attained by O(r,P), given r > n , is -EP\L(co) - n\ - c. The largest value
attained by <D(r,P), given r < n is trivially, -Ep\L(co)\. We see that:
-Ep\L{co)\-{-EP\L{co)-n\-c)




where the last inequality is the "triangle inequality." Therefore, O(r,P) attains it
maximum at any r with r < n , in particular, at r(P) = 0 . •
The only difficulty in showing that r(P) is an optimal rule is showing that the court
would not want to award more than the median to encourage plaintiffs with worthy
cases who happen to have median recovery less than their nominal cost to bring suit.
But if this nominal cost is less than the social opportunity cost of hearing the case, then
there will be no such plaintiffs. By an argument based on the triangle inequality, the
reduction in accuracy caused by awarding the plaintiff more than the median (in order
to induce her to sue) will outweigh the benefit of having her sue. Note also that this is
an optimal rule because, the court may award anything less than the plaintiffs nominal
cost in the "otherwise" case.
It is important to note that this optimal policy is not subgame perfect. It is
supported by the threat that the court will in certain circumstances take actions which
are not, at the time they are made, in its own best interest. That is, after hearing a
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case, whatever the case's ex post value, the best policy for the court from that point
onward is still to award median recovery. The cost of hearing the case is already
sunken and thus not relevant to the court's current decision. The recovery rule
described above will only work if the court can make a credible commitment not to give
in and award median recovery in cases which turn out to be, in retrospect, not worth
hearing. In the typical game theoretic model of individual or firm behavior, lack of
subgame perfection is a fatal flaw. However, in a model of a court system governed by
rules of procedure and precedent, threats by the court system to follow rules which ex
post seem senseless for all parties are plausible. Indeed, constructing models wherein
the parties' beliefs about the court are not shaped by subgame perfection seems the
more realistic alternative.
4. INCORPORATING P R E - T R I A L BARGAINING
While precise figures differ across studies, it is well accepted that a supermajority
of civil suits never reach trial. How does this affect the foregoing analysis of the
burden of proof? In this section I show that the optimal recovery policy with pre-trial
settlement still resembles the burden of proof. Now, however, the award for those
cases which meet the burden is not median legal recovery, but median recovery plus
some function of the parties prospective trial costs. Moreover, the threshold level of
dispersion is tied not to these trial costs as in the previous section, but to the cost to
society of the process of litigation, including filings, discovery and settlement
negotiations, up to but not including trial.
The simple litigation "game" in this model with pre-trial negotiation has several
steps. First the court announces a recovery policy, r(P) to all potential parties. Next,
plaintiff, knowing P and r(P), decides whether to file suit. Third, the case enters
settlement negotiations, which imposes costs of GK > 0 and <J5 > 0 on plaintiff and
defendant respectively. The cost to society of this settlement phase is <J > 0 . In this
settlement phase, defendant, who also knows P, r(P), and n makes a settlement offer
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s to plaintiff. Fourth, the plaintiff decides whether to accept this offer. If so, the
game is over and the defendant pays s to plaintiff. If not, the plaintiff decides whether
to take his case to trial. If so, the case enters the trial phase at a cost of n > 0 , A > 0
and c> 0 to plaintiff, defendant and society, respectively. In this phase, as before, the
court hears the evidence in the case, updates its prior belief about the fact pattern from
Po to P and then orders defendant to pay r(P) to plaintiff.
If we fix a recovery policy, r(P), we can solve the resulting game of perfect
information between plaintiff and defendant by backwards induction. Having filed a
case and rejected a settlement offer, plaintiff continues with the case if and only if
r(P) > n . Therefore, plaintiff accepts defendant's settlement offer, if and only if
s > max(r(P) - TT,0) .
It is then optimal for defendant to offer max(r(P) -x,Q). For if, on the one hand,
r(P) - n < 0 , then the plaintiff will not bring the case to court anyway, even if
r(P) + A > 0 , and so the defendant should offer 5 = 0 = max(r(P) - /r,0). If, on the
other hand, r(P) - n > 0 , then the plaintiff will bring the case to court and so the
defendant stands to lose r(P) + A > 0 . The plaintiff will accept any offer above
r(P) - K < r(P) + A and so the defendant should offer the smallest acceptable offer:
r(P) -7i = max(r(P) - /r,0).
Since plaintiff knows that this is how settlement negotiations will proceed, she files
suit, if and only if s = max(r(P) - ;r,0) > Gn , or equivalently, if and only if
In sum, only cases that meet the condition r(P) >n + oK are filed and of these, the
defendant ends up paying the plaintiff r(P)-n. The court's problem is then:
Choose r(P)
to Maximize J (-Ep\L(co) - (r(P) - TT)\ - o)dQ + J -Ep\L(a))\lQ (2)
r{P)-7t>an r{P)-K<an
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We can view this problem as one of choosing (r(P) - n) to maximize (2) and then
adding n to the answer to get the optimal r(P). (We need not add n for those cases
where we have set recovery low enough to induce the plaintiff not the file suit.) It is
clear then that the problem (2) is of the same form as the problem in the previous
section with aK playing the role of n and o playing the role of c. If we similarly
assume
ASSUMPTION 3. 0 < an < a .
then we have already proven:
PROPOSITION 2. The recovery policy
r(P) = \Vp + 7r
[0, otherwise
solves the court's problem (2), with pre-trial negotiation.
In this optimal policy, the court is still using its recovery policy to affect the
plaintiffs incentive to file suit. But, since pre-trial negotiation lowers the cost of
"adjudication" broadly defined, the universe of cases which are worth adjudicating is
larger. Accordingly the threshold level of dispersion is lower-it is now keyed on
settlement costs cr rather than the costs of the entire process from filing to judgment,
c. On the other hand, the court is also still using its recovery policy to make awards to
plaintiffs whose cases are worth adjudicating. But this less costly method of
adjudication—settlement in the shadow of trial-has a biased outcome relative to what
the court would award if it heard the case, namely the median, vp. This is because
plaintiffs trial costs mean that defendants need not offer full expected recovery to
obtain acceptance. Therefore, the court must correct for this bias by awarding the
median plus the plaintiffs trial costs.
The model is robust to the structure of pre-trial negotiations. If, for example, the
plaintiff made the offer and the defendant decided whether to accept or reject, recovery,
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when granted at all, would correct for the resulting bias in favor of the plaintiff. We
can also allow for a more fluid negotiation scheme and merely assume an independent
probability distribution over the plaintiff's share of the surplus (which encompasses the
case wherein the surplus is always split in some fixed proportion). Then the optimal
recovery policy would correct for the expected bias of settlement outcomes. For
example, the plaintiffs share were uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and
plaintiffs and defendant's trial costs were equal, there would be no bias and no need
for correction.
The model is also robust to allowing the court to condition recovery on the
defendant's settlement offer, as in Rule 68. (Note again that the recovery can include
fee shifting.) In this case, the defendant will offer mins:s > max(r(P,s) - /r,0). If we
assume that r(P,s) is lower semi-continuous in s , then for every P, we can find a
solution s(P) to mins:s > max(r(P,s) - TT,O) and at that solution
s(P) = max(r(P,s(P)) - ;r,0). Defining r(P) = r(P,s(P)) we may proceed as above to
find the optimal r(P) and then set r(P,s) = r(P,s(P)) for all s . Hence, the court can
not improve its objective by conditioning on defendant's settlement offer.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown how a form of burden of proof— in particular, a rule by
which no recovery is granted to plaintiffs unless dispersion in the court's posterior falls
below a threshold level-is the optimal solution to the court's basic problem of
balancing its desire to 1) award its best estimate of proper recovery and 2) create the
proper incentives for plaintiffs in their decision of whether to sue. In the simple model
presented here, such a policy allowed the court to achieve its (ex ante) first best
outcome.
The model might be extended in several directions. 1) A more general objective
function for the court could be used—one which allowed for: a) the asymmetric
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weighting of over versus under compensation of plaintiffs and b) non-linear (e.g.
squared or squared-rooted) error costs. Generalizing the model in this manner would
allow it to encompass situations wherein efficient incentives for precaution or activity
level (in the activity generating the legal claim) dictate the asymmetric and/or nonlinear
treatment of litigation error. 2) A more general model would allow for the possibility
that plaintiffs themselves are unsure of what the court's posterior will be (but are still
more certain than the court itself prior to the hearing). 3) A more general model
would incorporate the endogenous choice of trial preparation effort.
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1
 It is traditional to distinguish two types of burdens of proof in civil litigation: a
burden of pleading and a burden of production or persuasion. In this paper, I consider
only the latter concept, which is often referred to simply as the "burden of proof." It is
also worth emphasizing that the plaintiff does not always have this burden, as when the
defendant must prove the plaintiffs contributory negligence in tort. There seems,
however, to be general agreement among legal scholars that the plaintiff usually bears
the burden and that, whoever bears the burden, so bearing means having to prove one's
case with a "preponderance of the evidence." Lastly, note that the burden (on the
prosecution) in criminal cases~the "reasonable doubt standard "--is universally regarded
as more difficult to bear. In this paper, I consider only civil litigation. Lastly, I ignore
the fact that rebuttable presumptions may change the placement of the burden. For a
general review, see James, Hazard and Leubsdorf (1992) pp. 337 et. seq. and Lempert
and Saltzburg (1983), pp. 792 et seq.
2
 In his general discussion Cohen seems to indicate that the fact finder's goal is to learn
about the true probability that the factual assertion is correct, rather than whether the
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assertion is correct. This is a direct-perhaps too direct-analogy to the canonical
statistical problem of estimating the underlying probability of success (e.g. the
probability of heads) in a Bernoulli distribution (e.g. a possibly biased coin toss)
through repeated random sampling. To be sure, Cohen does include a hypothetical
contract dispute. But rather than illustrating how confidence intervals fit into the
typical fact finding problem, the example merely embeds a typical statistical problem-
estimation of the Bernoulli success probability—into a somewhat uncommon legal
setting. In Cohen's example, defendant retailer avers some probability that a product
shipped to plaintiff-though never received- was merchantable under the U.C.C. The
mail order contract was F.O.B. and the plaintiff, not challenging this fact—does not sue
for breach. The defendant makes her case based on the random sample she obtained
when testing the shipment from her wholesaler in which plaintiffs particular product
was contained.
3
 The correspondence between this problem and the canonical statistical problem of
determining confidence intervals in estimating the mean of normal distribution with
known variance are as follows: x the fact pattern in the fact-finder's problem,
corresponds to the mean of the normal distribution; v, the evidence in the fact-finder's
problem, corresponds to the random sample generated from the normal distribution3 y;
the probability of y conditional on any given x corresponds to the sample distribution
for a fixed mean; and lastly, the fact-finder's prior beliefs over pairs (x,y) and the
probability of x for any given v correspond to the nothing in the classical statistical
framework, but to the prior and posterior (onx), respectively, in the Bayesian statistical
framework.
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4
 Cohen (1985), p. 403.
5
 See, e.g. Degroot, p. 398, et seq.
6
 There are results in statistics which give sufficient conditions on the structure of the
problem for when confidence intervals, presuming they exist, may be interpreted in the
probabilistic sense. See, e.g., Degroot, p. 398, et seq.
71 will proceed as if money damages were the only remedy.
8
 In reality trial courts do not always know what the law is either and thus face both
legal and factual uncertainty. I am abstracting from legal uncertainty faced at the trial
level.
9
 In reality the court could utilize some form of summary procedure. I do not consider
this possibility.
10
 Using squared rather than absolute error would lead to the same results as below with
expected value substituted for the median and variance for "dispersion," 5. Indeed,
the essential results of the model obtain with more general objectives. The crucial, and
generalizable, characteristic of the objective used here is that it is decreasing on either
side of its global maximum. This creates a crude concavity in the court's value
function which in turn produces what is essentially risk aversion. This risk aversion is
the reason that the court prefers cases with lower dispersion.
11
 Such a prior belief is a probability measure on Q (with sigma algebra understood).
This probability measure induces a distribution for the random variable L.
12
 The number x is median of the random variable X if Pr(X > x) = ?r(X < x) = \ . A
random variable may have no median or many media. A random variable has a median
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if its cumulative is continuous. If L has many media, all yield the same payoff. If L
had no media, optimal recovery in this problem is the minimum value of / such that
13
 In what follows, I proceed as if the opportunity cost of the hearing were fixed and
constant across all suits. This is merely a simplifying assumption. All that is necessary
for the results is that the cost of the hearing is known beforehand to the plaintiff and
revealed to the court sometime before recovery is granted. In the more general case,
the court's recovery policy (see below) would vary with both P and c.
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